The bushfires in Australia have gotten me very interested in ways to reduce deaths and property loss from wildfires.
If there are any folks from Australia or the U.S. with experience or interest in this subject, please leave a comment.
Thanks,
Mark
On Roger Pielke's Prometheus blog, Jonathan Gilligan had some comments about Julian Simon's message with which I disagreed. But that wasn't really relevant to the Prometheus post, so I'm putting responses here.
“When I read The Ultimate Resource II, Simon seems clearly to be saying that we don’t need to worry about running out of oil or any other natural resource because human ingenuity will provide cheap alternative energy sources to replace them, fairly painlessly.”
I mostly agreed with you up to the “fairly painlessly” part. I think Julian Simon’s argument was not that the transitions would be “fairly painless,” but that after the transitions occurred, people would actually be better off. (That there was never going to be a permanent step downward in well-being, due to a permanent lack of a resource.)
“The whole argument of Ultimate Resource II is that scarcity does not exist because resources are not finite.”
No, that can’t possibly be the “whole argument of Ultimate Resource II,” because Julian Simon was an economist, and that argument completely defies the entire premise of economics.
The whole argument of Ultimate Resource II was that the world would not run out of any resources, because resources are not finite…in any ***”useful economic definition”*** of the word:
Julian Simon on why resources aren't (economically) finite
Note that Julian Simon recognized that, for example, there are a finite number of copper atoms on earth at the present time. (That’s the mathematical definition of “finite.”) But he argued that the number of copper atoms on earth wasn’t meaningful in a “useful economic definition of the word.” A fine example of why this is so has come after his death, with the explosion of wireless communications. And in fact, wireless movement of electrical power is even being developed:
But Julian Simon never said that nothing was “scarce.” No sane economist would ever say that! He said resources were not “finite;” he didn’t say they weren’t “scarce.” Just because something isn’t “finite” doesn’t mean it isn’t “scarce.” For example, we can recycle electronics to recover the copper in them. But that doesn’t mean that the recycling is effortless (costless). If something takes time or money, it is time or money that could be spent on something else. So everything is “scarce,” although the degree of scarcity ranges tremendously (e.g. from paper to diamonds).
P.S. Note his conclusion to the article to which I linked:
" I continue to stand on the ground of non-finiteness, because I have found that leaving this ground causes more bad arguments than standing on it does. While I doubt that many people's judgment will be affected by what I write on this issue, there is little temptation to trim my sails to this wind.
There is little temptation to do that which is offensive to me - "admit" something that I do not believe is so."
Well written! He'll be missed.
This is the first in a series of posts that will describe a portable hurricane storm surge barrier that I think could--and should--be built. The barrier would be capable of being deployed to protect approximately 100 miles along the U.S. Gulf Coast or East Coast in a matter of days. I will eventually outline one possible design for such a system. My point in outlining one possible design is not to suggest that such a design is the best design, but simply to illustrate that such a system is in no way some science-fiction fantasy that could never be built and deployed.
Why build such a barrier? In a word, "Katrina." Or simply, "New Orleans." But also, "Miami." "Fort Lauderdale." "Tampa/St. Petersburg." "Jacksonville." "Galveston." "Virginia Beach." "Washington DC." "New York City."
The simple fact is that a major hurricane could strike anywhere along the Gulf Coast (1600 miles) or East Coast north to approximately Boston (another approximately 1600 miles). Currently, measures are being designed or envisioned that can partially protect single cities (e.g. levees and flood gates for New Orleans, flood gates for New York City). However, it would make more sense from an economic and engineering standpoint to design something that could protect approximately 100 miles of coastline days before a storm hits, rather than to protect individual cities by designing something that may not be challenged for many decades (during which time better systems could be built).
The damage from hurricane Katrina was virtually all caused by storm surge (rather than wind damage or inland flooding due to rain). Wikipedia currently estimates that the total economic damage to Louisiana and Mississippi may exceed $150 billion. That's just a single hurricane, and a single city. Moving to New York City, it's been estimated that there is an approximately 1-in-4 chance that a Category 3 or hurricane will hit New York City/Long Island in the next 50 years. Here are storm surge maps calculated by the SLOSH computer model, for various hurricanes hitting New York City and Long Island
Hurricane Storm Surge maps for NYC, calculated by SLOSH
Roger Pielke Jr. and others have estimated that if the Great Miami hurricane were to hit Miami in 2020, damages would be approximately $500 billion. (That's half a TRILLION dollars!)
Preview of AGU presentation: The $500 billion hurricane
Clearly, the risk of such economic consequences alone warrants significant thought about how to design and deploy such a hurricane storm surge protection system.
1) The pollution from hydrogen-boron fusion is essentially zero. Per unit of electricity generated, the life cycle pollution impacts from hydrogen boron fusion are less than natural gas, or even wind or photovoltaics (solar cells). (Let alone nuclear fission, oil, or coal.) Even life cycle carbon dioxide emissions from hydrogen-boron fusion are less than for photovoltaics or wind, because the amount of material needed to build a hydrogen-boron plant of a given electrical size is a tiny fraction of the material needed for a similar size plant.
2) The energy is extremely high density (extremely compact). When combined with reason #1, this means that hydrogen-boron fusion plants can be located even in the middle of densely populated cities. A hundred hydrogen-boron fusion plants could be located in the basements of buildings in downtown Manhattan, and could supply all the electricity needed by NYC.
3) Due to reasons #1 and #2, hydrogen-boron fusion completely eliminates the need for a nationwide electrical grid. No more high-tension lines, brownouts or blackouts.
4) Due to reasons #1, #2, and #3, electricity from hydrogen-boron fusion can be delivered to sites hit by disasters long before electricity from conventional sources. After major hurricanes, electrical power is often out in some areas for weeks, or even months. With hydrogen-boron fusion, a tractor-trailer trucks containing hydrogen-boron electrical generating plants could be used to repower a city like New Orleans in less than a week.
5) Hydrogen-boron fusion is continuous, not intermittent. Unlike solar cells and wind, hydrogen-boron can produce as much power as needed, any time needed. An electrical grid powered significantly by photovoltaics or wind would have a horrendous problem trying to match the intermittent supply of those energies with the demand for electricity.
6) Hydrogen-boron fusion can be used to power virtually ANY device. For example, airplanes use petroleum, because it has such high energy density (per unit volume and per unit mass). And the space shuttle’s external fuel tanks contain hydrogen and oxygen. But fusion is roughly a million times more powerful per unit mass than chemical reactions. So the amount of hydrogen required to fly from NY to LAX could literally be found in the bottled water brought on board for passengers to drink. And the space shuttle’s external tanks could be literally replaced by fuel weighing less than the astronauts themselves.
Obviously, Iraq in June 2007 is a bloody mess. If you had told me in March 2003 that Saddam’s government would be vanquished by the U.S. military in less than a month, but that the situation inside the country would actually be worse four years later, I wouldn’t have believed you.
The number of U.S. screw-ups in Iraq is so large, that one blog post couldn’t possibly cover all of them in any detail. I’m going to focus on one: the U.S. treatment of the defeated Iraqi military. Maybe at the time, it was not possible to see that the U.S. treatment of the Iraqi military would lead to a terrible result, but it certainly is possible now. So even if the lesson is to be learned for future wars, it would be valuable. But there may even be to recover somewhat even in Iraq.
The primary U.S. screw-up regarding the U.S. military versus the Iraqi military is that we never demanded a formal unconditional surrender by the Iraqi military. Iraqi military was allowed to simply melt back into the populace, with no formal acknowledgement of defeat, and no effort by the U.S. to provide assistance to a large number of armed and trained men who suddenly had no jobs.
Here is something we could have done in April of 2004. However, it seems to me it is something we STILL COULD DO in June of 2007:
1) Identify, to the extent possible, the entire make-up of Saddam Hussein’s military. Branch of service, division, battalion, platoon. Everything. Who were the generals? The colonels? Majors? Captains? Sargents? Privates?
2) Once they have been identified, invite them to sign a binding contract. The contract would require them to give something, and for giving something, they would get something.
3) They would acknowledge that the military of Iraq had been defeated in 2003, and would give their oath on the Quran (or Bible, or other religious text) that they would not participate in any way in any attack on a U.S. soldier for the next 2 years. In fact, they would also be required to inform the U.S. of any knowledge they have of anyone else who had planned or participated in an attack on U.S. troops.
4) They would also give their oath by voice, which would be recorded in a manner that would allow later voice analysis. They would sign their names to the binding contract. They would give a full set of 10 fingerprints. They would give blood that would allow DNA analysis. They would get retinal scans. They would be photographed from all angles. In fact—this would be very controversial—they might even be required to wear ankle bracelets so that the U.S. military could track their movements at all times.
5) In compensation for items 3 and 4, they would get full pay (i.e., what they got under Saddam) for the next 2 years by the U.S. This pay would be obtained directly from the U.S. military. They would also be given the option of either being a member of the new Iraqi military, or any other job of their choosing. If they choose to be a member of the military, they could collect whatever they collect from the Iraqi government. If they chose some other employment, they’d get whatever they could from that employer.
6) At the time the U.S. military paid the members of the Iraqi military, they could be questioned about any recent attacks on U.S. or Iraqi troops. Also, it might be useful to offer bonuses of up to several weeks’ pay for information that ended up leading to the arrest and conviction of perpetrators of attacks. If any Iraqi military member was found to be guilty of an attack on U.S. troops, he would forfeit all remaining pay, and could be prosecuted by the U.S. military, and held for up to two years in a U.S. military prison within Iraq.
These are just ideas of what could be done. But the main aspects are:
1) Every member of the Iraqi military acknowledges defeat, and swears on a religious text not to attack U.S. soldiers,
2) All members of the Iraqi military are identified by multiple methods, such that if they participate in an attack, it may be possible to later identify them. Further, the structure/membership of the Iraqi military is known, right down to platoon/squad level.
3) All members of the Iraqi military are given two years full pay…even if they decide to pursue other careers.
3) The U.S. government does the payments (not the Iraqi government).
4) Because the U.S. government does the payments, it can also question all former military members about any attacks that occur.
Does anyone have any thoughts about this? Does anyone know how to slip this suggestion into President’s or Vice President’s daily reading? ;-)
Roger Pielke Jr. found a figure in the latest IPCC report that he calls"just embarrassing."
However, I've found an even more remarkable IPCC figure: it's Figure S&M-XXX (it's really buried, so you'll have to really dig down to find it).
It compares normalized global weather-related losses with U.S. patents issued. There is a clear correlation. It's obvious that increasing the number of U.S. patents issued causes normalized global weather-related losses to increase. When will the U.S. Patent Office start behaving responsibly, and stop issuing patents???! (Will it only be when G.W. Bush leaves the Whitehouse?)
I’ve written (repeatedly) that the “projections” in the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report are pseudoscientific nonsense. I haven’t seen the Fourth Assessment Report, but I’m so confident (or would that be depressed?) that they will be nonsense too, that I propose a better way.
The fundamental problem is that the IPCC has no incentive to tell the truth in its projections. But they do have an incentive to lie...to exaggerate the amount of warming that’s likely to occur. So that’s what they do...they lie. I propose the following solution:
The U.S. government should set up a prize fund totaling $400 million, payable in 2031. The prize fund would be open to any U.S. university with accredited science or engineering programs. The fund would be awarded as $200 million for first place, $100 million for second, $50 million for third, $25 million for fourth, $12 million for fifth, $6 million for sixth, $3 million for seventh…and $1 million until we run out of money.
Prizes would be awarded for most closely predicting the following parameters:
1) globally averaged surface temperature anomaly for 2029-2031, relative to 1990;
2) globally averaged lower tropospheric temperature anomaly for 2029-2031, relative to 1990;
3) Atlantic hurricane basin sea surface temperature anomaly for 2029-2031, relative to 1990;
4) average insured U.S. hurricane losses for 2029-2031,
5) global sea level rise for 2029-2031, relative to 1990;
6) CO2 atmospheric concentration;
7) anthropogenic (industrial) CO2 emissions;
8) methane atmospheric concentration,
9) anthropogenic methane emissions,
10) anthropogenic black carbon emissions,
The ten parameters listed above would be weighted such that the first 5 parameters are twice as important as the bottom 5. Let’s say 100 universities enter the contest, with #1 given to the best prediction for each parameter, and #100 given to the worst prediction for each parameter.
Let’s take hypothetical University X (not Xavier!).: Suppose its rankings on the first 5 predictions are: #3, #4, #10, #20, #60. Since all those are multiplied by 2, its score would be: (3+4+10+20+60)*2 = 194. Suppose its rankings for the bottom 5 predictions are #20, #6, #70, #10, #8. Its score on the second 5 would be 114. So the total score would be 194 + 114 = 308. The university with the LOWEST score would get the $200 million first prize, the university with the next lowest score would get $100 million, and so on.
For a total investment of $400 million, the U.S. government would get far better predictions than it currently gets from the IPCC. (In fact, it’s not possible to get poorer predictions than from the IPCC…but that’s another story.)
In fact, Exxon-Mobil (to choose just one company at random ;-)) could get a similarly good deal by offering a prize fund of only $4 million (i.e. the proposed U.S. government prize to universities, divided by 100). But this would be payable to INDIVIDUALS (or their heirs). Exxon could restrict the prize fund to 100 scientists of its choosing. The top prize of $2 million in 2031 would certainly be enough incentive to make truthful predictions!
Dr. Tom Wigley apparently made some comments about my comments on the Gristmill blog:
Dr. Tom Wigley's comments, and my responses
These were my responses to his comments. (I want to have my responses on my blog, in addition to the Gristmill blog.)
Dr. Wigley apparently writes, "markbahner said that the probability of warming less than 1.4C was 50% and the probability of warming greater than 5C was zero."
That's close, but my exact words were, "The simple fact is that there is approximately a 50/50 chance that the warming will be less than 1.4 deg C...and there is virtually no chance (far less than 1 percent) that the warming will be over 5 deg C."
Dr. Wigley continues, regarding the "projections" in the IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR), "IPCC did not assign a probability to the 1.4-5.8C range. It was recognized that to so may have been useful, but it was beyond the state of the science (insofar as IPCC can only review the science, not do new science)."
That extraordinary comment provides compelling evidence of the deep scientific pathology of the current state of climate "science." I've personally developed two sets of my own probabilistic predictions for methane atmospheric concentrations, CO2 emissions and atmospheric concentrations, and resultant lower tropospheric temperature increases. The second set is here:
My own probabilistic predictions were developed in my spare time, almost certainly with less than 100 hours of research, thought, and calculations, and only a pocket calculator. By 2001, when the IPCC published the TAR, there had obviously been two previous assessment reports, with more than a full decade having passed since the first assessment report was published in 1990. In that time, hundreds, if not thousands, of people were working full time on climate research. Dr. Wigley is stating that the entire climate change community was unable to come up with probabilistic predictions in over a decade of research, including countless conferences (in some very nice locales) and a great many powerful computers running climate simulations. I'm sorry, but if a simple set of probabilistic predictions for methane atmspheric concentrations, CO2 emissions and atmospheric concentrations, and resultant lower tropospheric temperature increases was beyond the IPCC and the climate change community after more than a full decade of research by hundreds or thousands of people, it's simply because the IPCC and climate change community aren't very interested in doing science.
Dr. Wigley continues, "So Sarah Raper and I did the appropriate probabilistic calculations...We found that there was a non-zero probability of warming less than 1.4C and a non-zero (but smaller) probability of warming above 5.8C. You can estimate the probabilities from the above-cited paper. We found the 90% C.I. to be 1.68C to 4.87C."
I commend Drs. Wigley and Raper (WR) for injecting a modest amount of science into the IPCC process for developing "projections" based on "scenarios." As he reports, the WR paper calculated a 5% probability of warming less than 1.68C, a 50% probability of warming less than 3.06C, and a 95% probability of warming less than 4.87C. Therefore, WR and I agree that the probabililty of warming of 5 deg C or more is very remote (with WR estimating the odds at more than 20 to 1, and me at more than 100 to 1).
The differences between their predictions and mine regard the probability of warming near 1.4 deg C and 3.1 deg C. They estimate less than 5 percent chance of warming less than 1.4 deg C, whereas I estimate approximately a 50 percent chance of warming less than 1.4 deg C. Also, they estimate approximately a 50 percent chance of warming more than 3.1 deg C, whereas I estimate the probability of warming more than 3.1 deg C at less than 5 percent.
How do these differences in predictions arise? Well, the main reason for the differences is that Wigley and Raper assumed that all IPCC TAR scenarios had equal probability of occurrence, whereas I estimated that the most probable climate forcing for the 21st century would be somewhat less than the B1 scenario:
IPCC TAR scenarios and resultant temperature increases
So WR assume equal probability for all IPCC TAR scenarios. Is this a scientifically valid assumption? No, it is not. This is not a close call. Even a layperson can see that the assumption of equal probability is scientifically invalid. James Hansen's Keeling Lecture compared various IPCC scenarios with actual increases in CO2 and methane:
James Hansen's Keeling Lecture, see pages 42-44
Increases since 1990 of both methane and CO2 have been at the very bottom of all IPCC TAR scenarios. The WR assumption of equal probability for all scenarios is like assuming a straight-A student has equal probability of getting an A, B, C, D, or F in the next class he or she takes.
To summarize: The IPCC TAR scenarios are completely invalid, as a matter of science. The fact that the TAR had no probabilistic estimates is clear evidence of the pathology of the current state of climate "science." The Wigley and Raper paper is a significant improvement on the IPCC TAR. However, the WR assumption of equal probabilities for all scenarios is scientifically invalid. If WR had used a "50 percent probability" forcing near or less than the B1 scenario, as would be appropriate, their calculated probability of warming of more than 3.1 deg C would be well below 50 percent, and their calculated probability of warming less than 1.4 deg C would be much higher than 5 percent. Their calculations would produce results near mine, in fact.
TokyoTom on Roger Pielke Jr.'s Prometheus asks me some questions about a tax on fuels that emit CO2.
1)
“Is the atmosphere an unowned, open access common
resource?”
In
general, yes. There are exceptions, but let’s not talk about them for
now.
2)
“While wealth is created by private economic transactions, if an unregulated
good is used as part of the economic process, is some public wealth also
destroyed?”
It
depends. When the unregulated good is “used,” is its value somehow lost? A
great example of this is RP Jr.’s fave rave, using big scrubbers to suck CO2 out
of the air. Such plants have at least the *potential* for killing or seriously
stunting the growth of vegetation downwind. In that case, the air downwind
would be seriously degraded from the viewpoint of a farmer (for example). In
that case, the farmer’s wealth WOULD be destroyed. Another case would be using
groundwater, and discharging the used water to the surface (where only a small
fraction would find its way back to the water table). But I don’t see any
closely similar mechanism applying to CO2. First of all, no one is made sick
or has their property directly
damaged by CO2. Second, we aren’t even generally talking about damages
occurring at present; we’re talking about hypothetical damages occurring in the
fairly distant future (e.g. more than 30 years from
now).
3)
“Do market prices the cost of release of GHGs dumping at
$0?”
Not
entirely. For example, landfills generate a lot of methane. That methane can
be used to generate electric power, or to heat buildings. So there’s an
opportunity cost to releasing that methane, instead of using it to generate
generating electrical power or heat buildings. Similarly, if someone drives a
gas-guzzling car, that car costs more to refuel than a more fuel-efficient car.
That effectively puts a cost on the CO2 emitted.
4)
“Does the absence of a market signal tend to encourage economic behavior that
has destructive aspects, because actors have no incentive to rationalize their
use of the resource or to take into account damages that may result to others
from such activity?”
Yes,
but I don’t agree the market signal is completely absent. Plus, from the point
of view of future generations, I think the damages will be trivial (see
following answers).
5)
“Is this similar to a subsidy of current consumption taken from future
generations, extracted by means of impoverishing ‘unowned’ common
resources?”
Oh,
my. First, I don’t agree the resource is “impoverished.” Air with 600 ppm of
CO2 in it is not (significantly) less valuable than air with 300 ppm CO2.
Second, the “taken from future generations is important.” Let me give
illustrations:
Suppose
your grandparents had borrowed money before you were born, which you had to
repay (at no interest…just the amount of the debt)? Would you say that was
wrong? What if they borrowed 2x your current salary, and spent it all on
renting 100 berths (for their pets) aboard the Titanic? That would clearly be
wrong! But what if they’d borrowed $300 so your grandmother to could come to
America Russia
6)
“Are there true costs to using the global commons in this way? In looking at
this, please consider the conclusion that there is a discernible climate change
and a discernable human fingerprint on it, that temps have only risen one
degree, but climate sensitivity appears to be about 5+ F in the event of a
doubling. Besides considering the costs imposed by climate change through its
ecological effects, direct damage to human assets and activities and possible
benefits, please also consider the costs of adapting infrastructure to the
changes. Consider both costs already felt and those that can be anticipated and
discounted.”
First,
I have somewhat different numbers that I want to submit as the “true” numbers:
a) The warming from 1885 to 2005 is almost exactly 1 deg C…so that’s 1.8 deg F. b) I think the future warming has a 50/50 chance of being less than 1.5 deg
C…so that’s future warming of 2.7 deg F. But I’m just pointing that out because
I’m a geek, and spent a fair amount of my time determining the warming for
2100.
But
whatever. Let’s say that the damage from the future warming has a present value
of $3 trillion (year 2005 dollars). Let’s further assume 2% inflation
throughout the rest of the century (true inflation is much lower, but let’s
ignore that fact). Therefore, the value of the damage in year 2100 dollars is:
$3 trillion x 1.02^95 = ~$20 trillion. (Give or
take.)
Have
we done something bad? Well, let’s start by assuming that all the temperature
rise in 2100 is all *our*
fault…that the rise in 2070, 2080, 2090 is not at all caused by the people in
2100. All of the people in 2100 are completely blameless for any of the temperature rise. Have we done something bad,
sticking them with a $20 trillion debt? Well, just like the grandparents’ debt
scenario, the answer would be “it depends.” First, how rich are people in
2100? My answer is: “They will be so rich it is almost inconceivable today.”
The world GDP in 2000 was approximately $45 trillion (year 2000 dollars). I’m
predicting that the world GDP in 2100 will be approximately $80 QUADRILLION (year
2000 dollars).
7)
“In the absence of a pricing mechanism (via private ownership of emission
permits, taxation or other device) that values the use of the atmosphere as a
GHG dump, what market incentives do fossil fuel providers or consumers have to
move to new technologies that economize on GHG
emissions?”
As
I already mentioned, Japan, the EU, China, India, the U.S….we ALL have an
incentive to move away from: a) coal, because it emits so many *conventional* pollutants (e.g. SO2,
particulates, NOx, mercury, etc.), b) oil, because it costs so much, and because
the revenues go governments like those in Saudi Arabia and Iran.
8)
“Presumably you have no problem with purely private transactions between
economic actors involving resources and products owned by them; neither do I, so
long as I can also sue for any damages they might cause me. But the
externalities associated with certain behaviors has led to regulation, including
establishing private property rights in the case of SO2 emissions. What is so
conceptually different about establishing similar transferrable property rights
in GHJG emissions?”
The
huge conceptual difference is that SO2 emissions cause easily identifiable
damage to human health (e.g., through conversion to sulfate particles) and
property (e.g. through acid rain) right now. You’re talking about CO2 which we
THINK may cause damage (above the benefits) sometime in the future.
Do
you really want to reduce CO2 emissions as much as possible, at the lowest
possible cost? Well, rather than setting up a tax, and then hoping it will lead
to lower emissions (even though a simple market analysis will show that any
realistic tax will result in virtually no emission reduction) you should instead
be advocating for much more aggressive funding of research into non-CO2 emitting
technologies.
a) Do
you know what the U.S. government funding is for non-tokamak fusion? I don’t
know the exact number, but I do know for certain that it’s under $10 million per
year. And probably even under $1 million year.
b) Do
you know what federal funding for photovoltaics is? I do know that…it’s $64
million per year.
If
the U.S. government simply borrowed $10 billion (with a current debt of over $8
trillion, no one will even notice it), and spent $5 billion on non-tokamak
fusion research and $5 billion on photovoltaics, it would probably do a LOT more
to reduce worldwide emissions of CO2 in the 21st century than raising
the price of gasoline by $0.50 cents a gallon (at an ANNUAL cost of $65 billion)
will ever do. And if they spent a full $65 billion (one year of gasoline tax)
on non-tokamak fusion and photovoltaics, they’d almost certainly develop those
two technologies to a point where no one in the world would need to burn fossil
fuels for energy.
Robert Samuelson was right about global warming ("The Real Inconvenient Truth About Global Warming"). The real solution to global warming is to develop energy technologies that don't emit CO2 that people actually PREFER to existing energy technologies, because the new technologies are cheaper and better than existing technologies.
Resolved: Ocean acidification from CO2 emissions is one of the top 10 environmental problems in the world.
Recent Comments