Random Thoughts

U.S. patents cause global weather-related disasters!

Roger Pielke Jr. found a figure in the latest IPCC report that he calls"just embarrassing."

However, I've found an even more remarkable IPCC figure:  it's Figure S&M-XXX (it's really buried, so you'll have to really dig down to find it).

It compares normalized global weather-related losses with U.S. patents issued.  There is a clear correlation.  It's obvious that increasing the number of U.S. patents issued causes normalized global weather-related losses to increase.  When will the U.S. Patent Office start behaving responsibly, and stop issuing patents???!  (Will it only be when G.W. Bush leaves the Whitehouse?)

 

A method for achieving honest climate predictions

I’ve written (repeatedly) that the “projections” in the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report are pseudoscientific nonsense.  I haven’t seen the Fourth Assessment Report, but I’m so confident (or would that be depressed?) that they will be nonsense too, that I propose a better way.

The fundamental problem is that the IPCC has no incentive to tell the truth in its projections.  But they do have an incentive to lie...to exaggerate the amount of warming that’s likely to occur.  So that’s what they do...they lie.  I propose the following solution:

The U.S. government should set up a prize fund totaling $400 million, payable in 2031.  The prize fund would be open to any U.S. university with accredited science or engineering programs.  The fund would be awarded as $200 million for first place, $100 million for second, $50 million for third, $25 million for fourth, $12 million for fifth, $6 million for sixth, $3 million for seventh…and $1 million until we run out of money.

Prizes would be awarded for most closely predicting the following parameters:

1)    globally averaged surface temperature anomaly for 2029-2031, relative to 1990;
2)    globally averaged lower tropospheric temperature anomaly for 2029-2031, relative to 1990;
3)    Atlantic hurricane basin sea surface temperature anomaly for 2029-2031, relative to 1990;
4)    average insured U.S. hurricane losses for 2029-2031,
5)    global sea level rise for 2029-2031, relative to 1990;
6)    CO2 atmospheric concentration;
7)    anthropogenic (industrial) CO2 emissions;
8)    methane atmospheric concentration,
9)    anthropogenic methane emissions,
10)  anthropogenic black carbon emissions,

The ten parameters listed above would be weighted such that the first 5 parameters are twice as important as the bottom 5.  Let’s say 100 universities enter the contest, with #1 given to the best prediction for each parameter, and #100 given to the worst prediction for each parameter. 

Let’s take hypothetical University X (not Xavier!).:  Suppose its rankings on the first 5 predictions are:  #3, #4, #10, #20, #60.  Since all those are multiplied by 2, its score would be:  (3+4+10+20+60)*2 = 194.  Suppose its rankings for the bottom 5 predictions are #20, #6, #70, #10, #8.  Its score on the second 5 would be 114.  So the total score would be 194 + 114 = 308.  The university with the LOWEST score would get the $200 million first prize, the university with the next lowest score would get $100 million, and so on.

For a total investment of $400 million, the U.S. government would get far better predictions than it currently gets from the IPCC.  (In fact, it’s not possible to get poorer predictions than from the IPCC…but that’s another story.)

In fact, Exxon-Mobil (to choose just one company at random ;-)) could get a similarly good deal by offering a prize fund of only $4 million (i.e. the proposed U.S. government prize to universities, divided by 100).  But this would be payable to INDIVIDUALS (or their heirs).  Exxon could restrict the prize fund to 100 scientists of its choosing.  The top prize of $2 million in 2031 would certainly be enough incentive to make truthful predictions!

Responses to Dr Wigley's comments

Dr. Tom Wigley apparently made some comments about my comments on the Gristmill blog:

Dr. Tom Wigley's comments, and my responses

These were my responses to his comments.  (I want to have my responses on my blog, in addition to the Gristmill blog.)

Dr. Wigley apparently writes, "markbahner said that the probability of warming less than 1.4C was 50% and the probability of warming greater than 5C was zero."

That's close, but my exact words were, "The simple fact is that there is approximately a 50/50 chance that the warming will be less than 1.4 deg C...and there is virtually no chance (far less than 1 percent) that the warming will be over 5 deg C."

Dr. Wigley continues, regarding the "projections" in the IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR), "IPCC did not assign a probability to the 1.4-5.8C range. It was recognized that to so may have been useful, but it was beyond the state of the science (insofar as IPCC can only review the science, not do new science)."

That extraordinary comment provides compelling evidence of the deep scientific pathology of the current state of climate "science."  I've personally developed two sets of my own probabilistic predictions for methane atmospheric concentrations, CO2 emissions and atmospheric concentrations, and resultant lower tropospheric temperature increases. The second set is here:

My predictions

My own probabilistic predictions were developed in my spare time, almost certainly with less than 100 hours of research, thought, and calculations, and only a pocket calculator. By 2001, when the IPCC published the TAR, there had obviously been two previous assessment reports, with more than a full decade having passed since the first assessment report was published in 1990. In that time, hundreds, if not thousands, of people were working full time on climate research.  Dr. Wigley is stating that the entire climate change community was unable to come up with probabilistic predictions in over a decade of research, including countless conferences (in some very nice locales) and a great many powerful computers running climate simulations.  I'm sorry, but if a simple set of probabilistic predictions for methane atmspheric concentrations, CO2 emissions and atmospheric concentrations, and resultant lower tropospheric temperature increases was beyond the IPCC and the climate change community after more than a full decade of research by hundreds or thousands of people, it's simply because the IPCC and climate change community aren't very interested in doing science.

Dr. Wigley continues, "So Sarah Raper and I did the appropriate probabilistic calculations...We found that there was a non-zero probability of warming less than 1.4C and a non-zero (but smaller) probability of warming above 5.8C. You can estimate the probabilities from the above-cited paper. We found the 90% C.I. to be 1.68C to 4.87C."

I commend Drs. Wigley and Raper (WR) for injecting a modest amount of science into the IPCC process for developing "projections" based on "scenarios." As he reports, the WR paper calculated a 5% probability of warming less than 1.68C, a 50% probability of warming less than 3.06C, and a 95% probability of warming less than 4.87C. Therefore, WR and I agree that the probabililty of warming of 5 deg C or more is very remote (with WR estimating the odds at more than 20 to 1, and me at more than 100 to 1).

The differences between their predictions and mine regard the probability of warming near 1.4 deg C and 3.1 deg C.  They estimate less than 5 percent chance of warming less than 1.4 deg C, whereas I estimate approximately a 50 percent chance of warming less than 1.4 deg C.  Also, they estimate approximately a 50 percent chance of warming more than 3.1 deg C, whereas I estimate the probability of warming more than 3.1 deg C at less than 5 percent.

How do these differences in predictions arise?  Well, the main reason for the differences is that Wigley and Raper assumed that all IPCC TAR scenarios had equal probability of occurrence, whereas I estimated that the most probable climate forcing for the 21st century would be somewhat less than the B1 scenario:

IPCC TAR scenarios and resultant temperature increases

So WR assume equal probability for all IPCC TAR scenarios.  Is this a scientifically valid assumption?  No, it is not.  This is not a close call.  Even a layperson can see that the assumption of equal probability is scientifically invalid.  James Hansen's Keeling Lecture compared various IPCC scenarios with actual increases in CO2 and methane:

James Hansen's Keeling Lecture, see pages 42-44

Increases since 1990 of both methane and CO2 have been at the very bottom of all IPCC TAR scenarios.  The WR assumption of equal probability for all scenarios is like assuming a straight-A student has equal probability of getting an A, B, C, D, or F in the next class he or she takes.

To summarize:  The IPCC TAR scenarios are completely invalid, as a matter of science.  The fact that the TAR had no probabilistic estimates is clear evidence of the pathology of the current state of climate "science."  The Wigley and Raper paper is a significant improvement on the IPCC TAR.  However, the WR assumption of equal probabilities for all scenarios is scientifically invalid.  If WR had used a "50 percent probability" forcing near or less than the B1 scenario, as would be appropriate, their calculated probability of warming of more than 3.1 deg C would be well below 50 percent, and their calculated probability of warming less than 1.4 deg C would be much higher than 5 percent.  Their calculations would produce results near mine, in fact.

Some Questions and Answers on Fuel Taxes

TokyoTom on Roger Pielke Jr.'s Prometheus asks me some questions about a tax on fuels that emit CO2. 

1)  “Is the atmosphere an unowned, open access common resource?”

In general, yes.  There are exceptions, but let’s not talk about them for now.

2)    “While wealth is created by private economic transactions, if an unregulated good is used as part of the economic process, is some public wealth also destroyed?”

It depends.  When the unregulated good is “used,” is its value somehow lost?  A great example of this is RP Jr.’s fave rave, using big scrubbers to suck CO2 out of the air.  Such plants have at least the *potential* for killing or seriously stunting the growth of vegetation downwind.  In that case, the air downwind would be seriously degraded from the viewpoint of a farmer (for example).  In that case, the farmer’s wealth WOULD be destroyed.  Another case would be using groundwater, and discharging the used water to the surface (where only a small fraction would find its way back to the water table).  But I don’t see any closely similar mechanism applying to CO2.   First of all, no one is made sick or has their property directly damaged by CO2.  Second, we aren’t even generally talking about damages occurring at present; we’re talking about hypothetical damages occurring in the fairly distant future (e.g. more than 30 years from now).

3)  “Do market prices the cost of release of GHGs dumping at $0?”

Not entirely.  For example, landfills generate a lot of methane.  That methane can be used to generate electric power, or to heat buildings.  So there’s an opportunity cost to releasing that methane, instead of using it to generate generating electrical power or heat buildings.  Similarly, if someone drives a gas-guzzling car, that car costs more to refuel than a more fuel-efficient car.  That effectively puts a cost on the CO2 emitted.

4)  “Does the absence of a market signal tend to encourage economic behavior that has destructive aspects, because actors have no incentive to rationalize their use of the resource or to take into account damages that may result to others from such activity?”

Yes, but I don’t agree the market signal is completely absent.  Plus, from the point of view of future generations, I think the damages will be trivial (see following answers).

5)  “Is this similar to a subsidy of current consumption taken from future generations, extracted by means of impoverishing ‘unowned’ common resources?”

Oh, my.  First, I don’t agree the resource is “impoverished.”  Air with 600 ppm of CO2 in it is not (significantly) less valuable than air with 300 ppm CO2.  Second, the “taken from future generations is important.”  Let me give illustrations:

Suppose your grandparents had borrowed money before you were born, which you had to repay (at no interest…just the amount of the debt)?  Would you say that was wrong?  What if they borrowed 2x your current salary, and spent it all on renting 100 berths (for their pets) aboard the Titanic?  That would clearly be wrong!  But what if they’d borrowed $300 so your grandmother to could come to

America

from the mother country,

Russia

, to marry your grandfather?  Would that be wrong?   Or suppose they’d “merely” spent it on several months rent during the Depression…would that be wrong?  Further, suppose when they died, their estate was worth $1000, and you got the debt of $300, but also got a quarter of the estate…or all of the estate?  Would that be wrong?

6)  “Are there true costs to using the global commons in this way? In looking at this, please consider the conclusion that there is a discernible climate change and a discernable human fingerprint on it, that temps have only risen one degree, but climate sensitivity appears to be about 5+ F in the event of a doubling. Besides considering the costs imposed by climate change through its ecological effects, direct damage to human assets and activities and possible benefits, please also consider the costs of adapting infrastructure to the changes. Consider both costs already felt and those that can be anticipated and discounted.”

First, I have somewhat different numbers that I want to submit as the “true” numbers:  a) The warming from 1885 to 2005 is almost exactly 1 deg C…so that’s 1.8 deg F.  b)  I think the future warming has a 50/50 chance of being less than 1.5 deg C…so that’s future warming of 2.7 deg F.  But I’m just pointing that out because I’m a geek, and spent a fair amount of my time determining the warming for 2100. 

But whatever.  Let’s say that the damage from the future warming has a present value of $3 trillion (year 2005 dollars).  Let’s further assume 2% inflation throughout the rest of the century (true inflation is much lower, but let’s ignore that fact).  Therefore, the value of the damage in year 2100 dollars is:  $3 trillion x 1.02^95 = ~$20 trillion.  (Give or take.)

Have we done something bad?  Well, let’s start by assuming that all the temperature rise in 2100 is all *our* fault…that the rise in 2070, 2080, 2090 is not at all caused by the people in 2100.  All of the people in 2100 are completely blameless for any of the temperature rise.   Have we done something bad, sticking them with a $20 trillion debt?  Well, just like the grandparents’ debt scenario, the answer would be “it depends.”  First, how rich are people in 2100?  My answer is:  “They will be so rich it is almost inconceivable today.”  The world GDP in 2000 was approximately $45 trillion (year 2000 dollars).  I’m predicting that the world GDP in 2100 will be approximately $80 QUADRILLION (year 2000 dollars).

7)  “In the absence of a pricing mechanism (via private ownership of emission permits, taxation or other device) that values the use of the atmosphere as a GHG dump, what market incentives do fossil fuel providers or consumers have to move to new technologies that economize on GHG emissions?”

As I already mentioned, Japan, the EU, China, India, the U.S….we ALL have an incentive to move away from:  a) coal, because it emits so many *conventional* pollutants (e.g. SO2, particulates, NOx, mercury, etc.), b) oil, because it costs so much, and because the revenues go governments like those in Saudi Arabia and Iran. 

8)  “Presumably you have no problem with purely private transactions between economic actors involving resources and products owned by them; neither do I, so long as I can also sue for any damages they might cause me. But the externalities associated with certain behaviors has led to regulation, including establishing private property rights in the case of SO2 emissions. What is so conceptually different about establishing similar transferrable property rights in GHJG emissions?”

The huge conceptual difference is that SO2 emissions cause easily identifiable damage to human health (e.g., through conversion to sulfate particles) and property (e.g. through acid rain) right now.  You’re talking about CO2 which we THINK may cause damage (above the benefits) sometime in the future.

Do you really want to reduce CO2 emissions as much as possible, at the lowest possible cost?  Well, rather than setting up a tax, and then hoping it will lead to lower emissions (even though a simple market analysis will show that any realistic tax will result in virtually no emission reduction) you should instead be advocating for much more aggressive funding of research into non-CO2 emitting technologies.

a) Do you know what the U.S. government funding is for non-tokamak fusion? I don’t know the exact number, but I do know for certain that it’s under $10 million per year.  And probably even under $1 million year.

b) Do you know what federal funding for photovoltaics is?  I do know that…it’s $64 million per year.

If the U.S. government simply borrowed $10 billion (with a current debt of over $8 trillion, no one will even notice it), and spent $5 billion on non-tokamak fusion research and $5 billion on photovoltaics, it would probably do a LOT more to reduce worldwide emissions of CO2 in the 21^st century than raising the price of gasoline by $0.50 cents a gallon (at an ANNUAL cost of $65 billion) will ever do.  And if they spent a full $65 billion (one year of gasoline tax) on non-tokamak fusion and photovoltaics, they’d almost certainly develop those two technologies to a point where no one in the world would need to burn fossil fuels for energy.

Robert Samuelson was right about global warming ("The Real Inconvenient Truth About Global Warming").  The real solution to global warming is to develop energy technologies that don't emit CO2 that people actually PREFER to existing energy technologies, because the new technologies are cheaper and better than existing technologies.

A modest proposal: A scientific debate on ocean acidification

Resolved:  Ocean acidification from CO2 emissions is one of the top 10 environmental problems in the world.

Responses to David Biello, and Fabulous Free Money Offer to SciAm Editors

David Biello, on the Scientific American (or “Scientific” American) blog, had comments about nuclear power ("Nuclear Loses Its Cool").  He wondered how nuclear power plants could ever be a solution to global warming, if they had trouble staying cool during heat waves.  That whole train of thought contains more nonsense than I’m willing to spend time on…but I did point out to him that he provided no statistical evidence to back up his concern, and even misreported one of the anecdotes he used to support his case.

Specifically, he wrote: "The results of this can be seen at American Electric Power's Cook plant in Michigan where temperatures in the control room reached 120 degrees F.”

The problem with his reporting of the event is that the Reuters article that he hyperlinked to does NOT say that the temperatures in “control room” reached 120 degrees F. 

If the Reuters article HAD said that, anyone who knows anything about nuclear power plants and their operation would say, “What the #%$*?!”…because having nuclear power plant workers working in a control room that is even above 85 degrees is a very serious situation.  People who are hot make mistakes.  I can not even conceive of a situation wherein a control room at a nuclear power plant that was online (i.e., supplying power to the grid) would be allowed to get above 90 degrees Fahrenheit, let alone up to 120 degrees Fahrenheit!   A utility that allowed such operation should--and almost certainly would--be run over hot coals by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission!

What the Reuters article actually says is, “ A spokesman for the Columbus, Ohio-based company said the unit was shut down because the temperature in the containment room(sic) reached 120 degrees Fahrenheit (49 degrees Celsius), exceeding allowable levels."

"Containment room."  NOT "control room!"  (Obviously.  Anyone who actually knows anything at all about nuclear power would know that it wasn't the "control room" that got up to 120 degrees Fahrenheit!")  "The thing is, I and other person pointed out David Biello's (obvious!) blunder, but he seems utterly incapable of recognizing it.  (This is a man who is an editor at Scientific American!)

Instead of saying, "Thanks for pointing out that obvious blunder.  I don't know how I could make such an obvious mistake!" David Biello responded with:

"I am confused about one thing: is there something unclear in my sentence that leads some to believe that I am confusing a containment room and a control room? I was trying to point to two different (but connected) problems related to heat that nuclear power plants were suffering. Perhaps it was merely proximity? Or perhaps I should have further explained the cooling mechanics of such a power plant? Anyway, it's an interesting writing question for me."

Some comments on this response:

 

1)   Your sentence is perfectly clear, David.  It's just clearly and blatantly WRONG.  The control room did *not* "get up to 120 degrees Fahrenheit."  You said it did.  Do you have trouble reading your own words?

 

2)  As far as your question, "Or perhaps I should have further explained the mechanics of cooling of such a power plant?"...I have a return question.  I have a Bachelors in Mechanical Engineering (with course emphasis on power generation) and worked on the analysis and design of nuclear power plants for 3.5 years for Babcock & Wilcox.  (I also worked on the design and analysis of advanced fossil-fired power plants and waste-to-energy plants.)  What is it in your background that makes you arrogant enough that you think you can explain the cooling mechanics of a nuclear power plant to me? 

 

David Biello concludes with, "Finally, please do not accuse me of misreporting. You can disagree with my analysis or opinion--or even the anecdotes I choose to include--but not my facts."

 

Bwahahahahahaha!  David, you're a hoot!  Once again, can't you read your own writing?  If not, why don't you get someone at Scientific American (or "Scientific" American) who CAN read your writing, and who knows the difference between a containment building (or "room" to the clueless writers and editors at Reuters) and a control room.  (Hint:  The control room is the ****AIR CONDITIONED*** room from which the operators control the plant.  And it does NOT get up to 120 degrees Fahrenheit while the plant is operating.)

 

Finally, I have a Fabulous Free Money offer to David Biello (and all the editors at Scientific American):  If any of you can provide *credible* evidence that the *control room* at the Cook Power plant in Michigan reached 120 degrees Fahrenheit on the day in question, I give the first person to do so $120.

Some responses on hurricane mitigation techniques

Jim,

You write, “I am a great fan of science fiction and someday in the distant future, suggestions like yours may be realistic,…”

If you think my suggestions—particularly the water-filled tubes as temporary storm surge barriers—are “science fiction,” then your "science fiction" is pretty tame!  (I’m thinking in particular of one of the books that had some influence on why I’m an environmental engineer today…Robert Heinlein’s “Farmer in the Sky.”  That book—about terraforming Jupiter’s moon Ganymede—was real science fiction!)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Farmer_in_the_Sky

“Your suggestions about reducing the strength of storms by covering or cooling the water would likely have extreme environmental consequences.”

Yes, that’s probably true.  But Hurricane Katrina alone produced 100 MILLION cubic yards of debris.  So let’s not pretend that hurricanes…especially Category 3 and higher hurricanes…don’t have extreme environmental consequences.  The real question is—or should be--“Do the adverse environmental consequences of hurricane reduction techniques exceed the adverse environmental consequences of hurricanes left at full strength?”

"Temporary hurricane walls are a logistical nightmare."

Speaking of logistical nightmares...how about this one?...

"A storm surge prediction program used by forecasters called SLOSH (Sea, Lake, and Overland Surge from Hurricanes) has predicted that in a category 4 hurricane, John F. Kennedy International Airport would be under 20 feet of water and sea water would pour through the Holland and Brooklyn-Battery tunnels and into the city's subways throughout lower Manhattan. The report did not estimate casualties, but did state that storms "that would present low to moderate hazards in other regions of the country could result in heavy loss of life" in the New York City area (Time, 1998)."

Do you think temporary hurricane walls present more of a logistical nightmare than that? 

"Where do you store them?"--->Don't know.  Every couple hundred miles along both coasts, perhaps?  Perhaps in the sea?   

"How do you deploy them?"--->Don't know.  By big ships like laying cable, maybe?

"How do you anchor them?"--->Don't know.  In my mind, they don't need anchors.

"How do you deal with rivers and streams (keeping the ocean out but allowing rivers and streams to continue draining)?"--->Don't know.  I just did a calculation (needs to be checked!) that says the entire discharge of the Mississippi River at New Orleans can discharge in a 100 square mile area, and it would only raise the level by 4 inches per 24 hours. So perhaps at New Orleans, you'd block the Mississippi River at Venice, and make your tubes go on a straight line to Pascagoula in the East, and Marsh Island in the West.  Then let the Mississippi drain into the triangle of mostly-water behind those tubes. 

"The average forecast error for 24 hours is near 70 miles in either direction. For 3 days or more, the average error is over 200 miles. If the storm is approaching the coast at an angle, the 70-mile error can translate into many hundreds of miles of coastline, making deployment impossible."

In my mind, the empty tubes are like a fire hose, in that they lie flat.  Perhaps ~500 miles of empty tubes could be deployed along the coast, and only sections where the hurricane is just about to come ashore would be filled with water?  I agree that deployment might be "extremely different" or "extremely costly." 

"There are many more reasons, costs and complications involved, but here is one that you might not have anticipated. Lawyers! If the hurricane hits 'naturally' there is little that lawyers can do. If humans have any effect on a hurricane, real or alleged, the lawsuits will fly faster than the storm winds."

So we let society be held hostage by lawyers?  We don't deploy systems that could save literally hundreds of billions of dollars, simply because lawyers would sue?  Wouldn't it make more sense to pass laws forbidding lawsuits for deployment of the systems?  Or perhaps have the federal government pay compensation for potential damages caused by deployment?

"I hate to be a spoil-sport, but the most cost effective and realistic mitigation of hurricanes remains in building, planning and insurance."

Well, I also hate to be a spoil-sport, but I don’t think you’ve spent even 4 hours thinking about what is “most cost effective and realistic.”  I have the same sort of questions for you that I had for Judith Curry:

1)  In the last 20 years, what has the damage from storm surge averaged in the United States?

2)  In the 2040-2060 period, what do you expect the damage from storm surge to average without any of the measures you advocate?

3)  In the 2040-2060 period, what do you expect the damage from storm surge to average with the measures you advocate?

4)  What do you think is the cost of the measures you advocate?

If you can’t answer these basic questions (and I’m almost certain you can’t, because I doubt you’ve put in any time to studying the matter) than I don't think you can say what is the "most cost effective and realistic mitigation of hurricanes."

Best wishes,

Mark

P.S.  I freely admit that I can't answer those questions for *my* potential solution, either.  But I've never made the claim that, for example, water-filled tubes *will* be a cost-effective solution.  I just think they *may* be, and are definitely worth more study than you (or I, or anyone I know of) have put into them.

How the IPCC can scientifically establish probabilities

Over on Tim Lambert's Deltoid blog, "brokenlibrarian" wrote:

"I'm still waiting for an explanation how the likelihood of the various IPCC scenarios could be determined."

I replied, "I gave you an explanation on April 15, at 9:47 PM:"

"...world per capita CO2 emissions have been almost completely flat for the last 30 years. (At about 3.95 billion metric tons of CO2 per capita per year.)

DOE EIA per-capita CO2 emissions spreadsheet

It seems like that ought to give the IPCC a clue about where to start."

Since the world per-capita emissions have been almost EXACTLY 3.95 tons of CO2 per year for the last 30 years, the IPCC could easily start with that assumption going forward as their "50% probability" case.

In other words, take the "50% probability value" with the  worldwide emissions of CO2 in the next 20-30 years increasing at about the same rate as the world population increases (currently about 1.2% per year...but expected to drop below 0.7% per year by 2030).

Mark Bahner versus (calculated) IPCC TAR

Alternatively, one could use the linear regression line from Hans Erren's graph of April 15, 8:42 AM as the "50% probability value":

Hans Erren's (excellent) CO2 graph

That would produce even lower emissions. 

Either method of analysis leads to the (correct) view that the "projections" in the IPCC TAR are pseudoscientific nonsense.

Complete set of predictions: Mark Bahner vs IPCC TAR

Previously, I published my predictions for lower tropospheric temperature increases, CO2 concentrations (ppm), industrial CO2 emissions (Gt as carbon), and methane atmospheric concentrations (ppb) versus those in the IPCC TAR.  Those previously published values were "50% probability" values. 

Note:  The IPCC TAR does not actually have probabilistic estimates.  Such estimates would be too scientific.  The way I developed the probabilistic estimates from the information in the IPCC TAR was to review a 2001 paper in Science by Wigley and Raper, and used the same basic method to develop "50% probability" for CO2 concentrations (ppm), industrial CO2 emissions (Gt as carbon), and methane atmospheric concentrations (ppb) from the IPCC TAR.  However, my basically eyeballing, rather than actually calculating log-mean values as was done for temperature by Wigley and Raper.

In any case, it's possible to do the same comparson for "5% probability" values and "95% probability" values...where "5% probability" means there is a 5% chance that the value will be lower than the stated value, and "95% probability" means there a 95% chance that the value will be lower than the stated value.  Here are the resultant values for my predictions versus the IPCC:

Table 1.  Temperature Increase Versus the Year 1990, in Degrees Celsius.

Year	IPCC Projections			Mark Bahner Projections
	5% Probability	50% Probability	95% Probability	5% Probability	50% Probability	95% Probability
1990	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
2000	0.09	0.16	0.21	0.00	0.08	0.15
2010	0.20	0.34	0.45	0.01	0.18	0.30
2020	0.32	0.55	0.80	0.02	0.27	0.50
2030	0.48	0.80	1.17	0.02	0.36	0.75
2040	0.62	1.10	1.60	0.02	0.46	0.95
2050	0.85	1.42	2.25	0.02	0.58	1.20
2060	1.05	1.75	2.75	0.02	0.70	1.50
2070	1.29	2.17	3.34	0.02	0.82	1.75
2080	1.43	2.45	3.90	0.02	0.94	2.00
2090	1.54	2.70	4.40	0.02	1.05	2.25
2100	1.68	3.06	4.87	0.02	1.20	2.45

Table 2.  Atmospheric CO2 Concentrations, ppm.

Year	IPCC Projections			Mark Bahner Projections
	5% Probability	50% Probability	95% Probability	5% Probability	50% Probability	95% Probability
1990	354	354	354	354	354	354
2000	365	369	373	365	369	373
2010	385	385	390	380	385	390
2020	405	413	420	395	405	413
2030	425	438	455	410	425	435
2040	455	470	500	420	455	464
2050	480	515	560	430	477	495
2060	510	560	630	435	502	525
2070	535	610	700	440	527	554
2080	550	645	780	440	542	583
2090	560	685	870	440	552	610
2100	570	720	930	440	558	635

Table 2.  Industrial CO2 Emissions, Gigatonnes as Carbon.

Year	IPCC Projections			Mark Bahner Projections
	5% Probability	50% Probability	95% Probability	5% Probability	50% Probability	95% Probability
1990	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0
2000	6.9	6.9	6.9	6.6	6.7	6.9
2010	7.8	8.7	10.0	6.7	7.4	8.3
2020	8.0	10.3	14.2	7.0	8.6	10.0
2030	8.7	13.2	18.8	6.5	8.8	11.5
2040	9.2	14.9	22.0	5.8	8.7	12.0
2050	8.7	16.0	26.0	5.0	8.3	12.2
2060	7.8	16.0	27.7	4.0	7.8	11.5
2070	6.6	16.4	29.5	3.2	7.0	11.5
2080	5.7	16.4	31.3	2.4	6.0	11.0
2090	4.6	17.1	33.5	1.7	5.0	10.5
2100	4.4	16.4	35.6	1.0	4.0	10.0

Table 4.  Atmospheric Methane Concentrations, ppb.

Year	IPCC Projections			Mark Bahner Projections
	5% Probability	50% Probability	95% Probability	5% Probability	50% Probability	95% Probability
1990	1688	1698	1708	1688	1698	1708
2000	1755	1770	1785	1755	1760	1785
2010	1838	1864	1892	1725	1770	1825
2020	1903	1950	2020	1695	1780	1865
2030	1950	2060	2200	1660	1790	1900
2040	1940	2120	2360	1630	1800	1935
2050	1920	2200	2620	1600	1810	1965
2060	1890	2250	2820	1570	1820	2000
2070	1830	2300	3000	1540	1825	2030
2080	1780	2350	3150	1510	1830	2060
2090	1710	2400	3300	1480	1835	2090
2100	1650	2450	3600	1450	1840	2120

Extension (and clarification) of Fabulous Free Money Offer

This is an extension--and clarification--of my Fabulalous Free Money Offer to Andrew Dessler.

I will give an additional $10 (so now we're up to $40, total) for your CERTIFIED BEST EFFORT predictions of atmospheric methane concentrations every decade from 1990 to 2100.  I want them in the same format as your other predictions, i.e., "5% probability, 50% probability, 95% probability".  See my Fabulous Free Money Offer of yesterday for details.

One more thing...an important clarification:  I want your predictions to be in the same conditions as mine and the IPCC's...without government mandates for GHG emission reductions.

Again, if you are at all uncertain about any of the conditions for these fabulous offers of free money, please ask me questions.